Air Power at the Battlefront by Dr Ian Gooderson

Author:Dr Ian Gooderson [Gooderson, Ian]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, General, Political Science, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9781136305955
Google: IODhrd0WD3sC
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2013-05-13T15:55:45+00:00

Bombing in Support of Breakthrough Operations

One limiting factor to the effectiveness of heavy and medium bombing of German defence localities in close support of attacks in open terrain was the paucity of targets offered by troops usually well dispersed. This meant that the number of German casualties and amount of equipment destroyed or damaged was unlikely to be decisive, and that sufficient troops and equipment were likely to survive to offer effective resistance.

Heavy and medium bombers were first employed against such field positions in Italy in a defensive rather than offensive context. In February 1944 heavy, medium and fighter-bombers were committed to support Allied troops defending the Anzio beachhead against determined German counterattacks. On 17 February they flew 724 daylight sorties, delivering 833 tons of bombs upon German positions and troop concentrations in the Anzio-Nettuno battle area.59 This effort, supplementing artillery and naval gunfire, was considered by the Allies to have been very effective, and the US Fifth Army later reported that the bombing kept the German troops pinned to the ground, retarded their movement and prevented the full power of their attack from developing. Moreover, the German artillery fire had ceased as the gunners went into and stayed in their dugouts.60

The bombing obviously had an impressive morale effect but, in fighting a defensive battle, Allied troops had little opportunity to learn to what extent bombing had inflicted casualties and damage. In fact neither had been as great as observers believed. General Erich Ritter von Pohl, commanding all German anti-aircraft artillery in Southern Italy, witnessed the bombing of the German positions around Nettuno and later recalled that the density of the bombing led abservers to expect the complete annihilation of the units under attack, but on entering the position shortly afterwards it was found that most of the artillery pieces, machine guns, and observation instruments were intact, and that even the effect on morale wore off after the initial experience.61

By August 1944 the Allies had sufficient experience to be aware of this phenomenon. This is shown in an assessment by No.2 ORS of one of the Normandy operations - TOTALISE. Launched on the night of 7/8 August 1944, TOTALISE was an attempt by II Canadian Corps to reach Falaise and was supported by 642 RAF heavy bombers dropping 3,460 tons of bombs on to five German defence localities flanking the attack. Afterwards, using as examples the known German defence strength in two villages in the battle, No.2 ORS outlined the level of casualties and destruction likely to be caused by bombing. La Hogue was held by 250 troops supported by seven guns deployed at a density of some 125 troops and three guns per 1,000 square yards. The ORS calculated that, targeted in two raids each of 100 heavy bombers, bombing would have caused about 30 German casualties and destroyed one gun. Rocquancourt was defended by some 700 troops supported by 26 guns deployed at a density of 175 troops and seven guns per 1,000 square yards. If targeted in

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